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SINTRODUCTION
Whether out of homage to superior wisdom, judicial economy, desire
for uniformity, or simple agreement, many state courts look to decisions of
the United States Supreme Court for guidance on state constitutional issues
or other issues where an analogy from federal law might be helpful. Many
state supreme courts, such as the Alaska Supreme Court expressly
reserve the power to interpret protections under their state constitutions
more broadly than similar protections under the federal Constitution. At
times, those courts that faithfully adhere to this republican spirit find sharp
division within their ranks.2
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1. See Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342 (Alaska 1969) ("We are not bound in
expounding the Alaska Constitution's Declaration of Rights by the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, past or future, which expound identical or closely similar provisions
of the United States Constitution."); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386,402 (Alaska
1970) ("We need not stand by idly and passively, waiting for constitutional direction fromthe highest court the he land."); see also State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 800 (N. 1990);
Statev. Boland, 800 P.2d 111 1114 (Wash. 1990); Pool v. Superior Court, 677 P.2d 261,271 (Ariz. 1984); State v. Arrington, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260 (N.C. 1984).Professor Lawrence Sager has argued that state courts should independently construe
their state constitutional provisions. Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: State Courts and theStrategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 'Ex. L. Rnv. 959
(1985); see also Shirley S. Abrahamson, Divided We Stand: State Constitutions in a More
Perfect Union, 18 HAS'rINS CONST. L.Q. 723, 724 (1991). As Professor Sager explains:State judges confront institutional environments and histories that vary dramatically
fom state to state, and that differ, in any one state, from the homogenized,
abstracted, national vision fom which the Supreme Court is forced to operate. It is
natural and appropriate that in fashioning constitutional rules the stte judges'
instrumental impulses and judgments differ.
Sager, supra, at 975-76.
2. For example, the New York Court of Appeals, the highest court of that state,recently refused to adopt the United States Supreme Court's "open fields" doecrine for the
state constitutional search and seizure provision. People v. Scott, 593 N..2d 1328 (N.Y.
1992). This decision provoked vigorous dissent from judges who viewed this wholesale
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A state court may adopt a United States Supreme Court rule, constitu-
tional or otherwise, without independent analysis or justification. A
troublesome issue arises, however, should the Supreme Court reconsider
that rle: Is the state court's adoption of federal precedent automatically
called into question? If the state court advanced no independent support
for the adopted federal rule, it seems logical that change in the underlying
federal rule would require reconsideration, if not abandonment of the
derivative state rule. Indeed, this situation often arises when a court fails
to articulate sufficiently the rationale or basis for its decision?
This type of ambiguity exists in Alaska law in the area of the retro-
activity of new legal rules.4 Retroactivity issues generally arise when a
court either overrules one of its prior decisions or announces a rule
governing a particular area of law which has not been previously
addressed. In such situations, the issue is whether the new rule will be
applied to other cases either pending at the time of the announcement of
the new rule, or filed after the announcement of the new rule but based on
events occurring prior to its announcement.
In deciding the retroactivity question, some state courts have adopted
a version of the United States Supreme Court's retroactivity jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court has generally treated the retroactivity of civil and
criminal rules as different matters, applying a separate set of retroactivity
rules in each area. The late 1980's, however, witnessed a revision of the
Court's criminal retroactivity jurisprudence and the 1990 term ended with
rejection of Supreme Court precedent as "New Federalism" gone wild. Id. at 1348(Bellacosa, I., dissenting).
3. Professor Joseph Goldstein argues that the United States Supreme Court has a duty
to set forth expressly the principles underlying its constitutional decisions:
If Ours is to be an "intelligent democracy," if Our revolutions are to be
peaceful, We the People. .. must be able to learn, from our Own reading of the
Constitution and the Supreme Court's constructions of it, what ihts We have and
do not have, what values are and are not protected, and what limits are and are notimposed on those who govern on Our behalf. For then We can meet Our respon-
sibility as informed citizens to respond to what the Court did and why it did it.JoSEPH GonsDEIN, ToE INTELUGIBLE CoNsm oN: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBUGATION
TO MAINTAIN nm CONSTITUTnON AS SOMETHING WE THE PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND 6(1992). Professor Goldstein's point applies equally to non-constitutional rules. As the
Alaska Supreme Court has recognized, the efficacy of law rests upon public consent and
acceptance. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 146-147. A udiciary that
neglects its duty to communicate its decisions to the public, in language the public can
understand, may erode that acceptance as well as the law's basis in the informed consent
of the govered.
4. As used in this article, the term "new legal rule" refers solely to rules of judicial
origin. The question of retroactivity of legislative enactments presents a separate question
beyond the scope of this article. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204(1988); Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Fairbanks N. Star
Borough Sch. Dist. v. Crider, 736 P.2d 770 (Alaska 1987); see also Elmer E. Smead, The
Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle ofJurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REv.
775 (1936).
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civil retroactivity on the verge of a new day. How will state courts
respond to these changes?
Retroactivity doctrines are generally framed with reference to the
procedural posture of the case in question. Courts distinguish between
cases on direct review and collateral review. A case pending on appeal
before it has become final is considered on direct review. After a case has
become final, a further attack on the judgment is considered on collateral
review. Thus, distinguishing between these types of review depends upon
whether a case is final. A case is generally considered final when the
litigants have exhausted all avenues of direct appeal and the time for
applying for a writ of certiorari has lapsed.'
Courts generally discuss four options when considering the application
of a new legal rule. First, a court may use "pure retroactivity" by applying
the new legal rule to all cases that come before it, whether on collateral or
direct review. Second, a court may use "fun retroactivity" by applying the
new legal rule to all cases not final, i.e., cases on direct review, on the date
of the rule's announcement. Third, a court may apply the new legal rule
with "selective prospectivity," restricting application of the rule to the case
announcing the new rule, all cases filed after that date, and selected cases
filed before that date.6 Fourth, a court may resort to "pure prospectivity,"
restricting the application of the rule to those cases filed after the date the
new legal rule was announced! Courts sometimes choose a hybrid of
these four methods, attempting to tailor their decisions to the specifics of
particular cases.8
The United States Supreme Court has recently reconsidered the
retroactivity issue. Part H of this article briefly analyzes the Court's
retroactivity jurisprudence as it has developed from the early 1960's to the
present. Part II analyzes the Alaska Supreme Court's reliance upon the
United States Supreme Court's retroactivity decisions and addresses the
desirability and likelihood that the Alaska Supreme Court will follow the
United States Supreme Court's change in this area.
H. FEDERAL RETROACVI IN FLUX
The United States Supreme Court has developed parallel doctrines of
retroactivity in the civil and criminal contexts. These doctrines, while
5. Linkletterv. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,622 n.5 (1965). The Alaska Supreme Court has
also applied a concept of finality. See infra notes 188, 267 and accompanying text.
6. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2444 (1991).
7. See id. at 2443 (opinion of Souter, J.).
8. See infra text accompanying note 189.
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never achieving identity, have recently converged towards a consistent
approach. Significantly, the Supreme Court appears poised to recognize
that retroactivity is an issue of constitutional nature, rooted in a proper
understanding of the role of the judiciary.9
A. Linklettei; Griffith, and Teague: Retroactivity and Constitutional
Criminal Procedure
For about 180 years, the United States Supreme Court utilized the pure
retroactivity approach in applying new rules of constitutional law.10
While the Court occasionally experimented with some form of
prospectivity in applying statutes" or common law rules,' 2 it held the
line on the pure retroactivity of constitutional decisions. Pure retroactivity
made sense in light of the traditional common law notion that judges
"found" law and legislatures "made" law.13 Under this theory, when a
judge announced anew legal rule, the judge was really only "finding" the
true law and giving it voice. The old rule was merely an incorrect attempt
to "find" the true law and, thus, was never really the law. Since the new
rule had always been law, the new rule automatically applied to all cases.
To do otherwise - to apply a rule only prospectively -- meant that the
judge had "made" a new rule of law for application in the future. 4 Such
in futuro lawmaking, with its attendant elements of discretion and
policymaking, more precisely embodied the legislative function. Thus, a
judge who refused to apply a new legal rule retroactively was thought to
exceed legitimate judicial authority and usurp a portion of the legislative
power.
The legal realists discredited this theoretical distinction between finding
and making law. The "find-make" law distinction masked the actual
discretion that judges exercise. Today, the remnants of the "find-make"
law debate focus on the proper role of the judiciary (active or restrained) in
our legal system.' 5 As Justice Scalia has noted, the modem proponents
of retroactivity recognize that "judges in a real sense 'make' law... as
judges make it, which is to say as though they were 'finding' it --
discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed
9. See generally Paul E. McGreal, Back to the Future: The Supreme Court's
Retroactivity Jurisprudence, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 595 (1992) (endorsing a
historically based retroactivity approach).
10. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623 (1965).
11. See Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
12. See Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
13. See Linkdetter, 381 U.S. at 623.
14. Id.
15. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439,2451 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment).
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to, or what it will tomorrow be.'16 Retroactivity, then, can be conceived
of as a struggle to define the proper role of the judiciary.
Retroactivity theory, however, evidenced a significant degree of tension
when confronted with the practical realities of the law, especially during
the Warren Court's revolution in constitutional criminal procedure. As the
Court expanded the constitutional protections of the criminally accused, the
Court faced the possibility of upsetting thousands of otherwise final
criminal convictions.17  The common law requirement of pure
retroactivity would have thrown the federal judicial system into chaos as
prisoners flooded the courts with challenges to their convictions on writs
of habeas corpus. To allow such wholesale challenge to state criminal
convictions would thwart the states' reasonable reliance on the old legal
rules.
1. Linkletter v. Walker. This tension in retroactivity analysis peaked
in Linkletter v. Walker.'s In Linkletter, the defendant sought retroactive
application of Mapp v. Ohio 9 to his case on collateral review.o Mapp
had applied the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. 2' Consequently, the Linkletter Court had to
choose one of the four retroactivity methods in applying the landmark
constitutional criminal procedure case. 2
The Court's analysis in Linkletter revolved around two conflicting
considerations. On the one hand, the Court considered the equitable
principle that like parties in litigation should be treated alike. Since Mapp
applied its rule to the defendant in that case, equity required that the rule
be applied to all parties in the same position, i.e., cases arising before
announcement of the rule in Mapp. On the other hand, the Court
recognized the practical reality of our modem criminal justice system.
Pure retroactivity would threaten convictions in "thousands of cases" that
16. Id. (emphasis in original) (Scalia, I., concurring in the judgment).
17. See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636.
18. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). For discussions of the pre-Linkletter retroactivity doctrine,
see Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of
Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 57, 62-70 (1965), and Herman Schwartz,
Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. Ci. L.
REV. 719, 747-57 (1966).
19. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)).
20. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 621 ("[The defendant's] final conviction was long prior to
our disposition of [Mapp].').
21. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. The exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction at trial of
any evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights.
22. Pure prospectivity was impossible because the Mapp Court applied its new rule to
the litigants in that case. Thus, the Linkletter Court faced only three choices: pure
retroactivity, full retroactivity, or selective prospectivity.
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had become final under the pre-Mapp rule2 Similarly, full retroactive
application of Mapp would defeat convictions gained through good faith
governmental reliance on the pre-Mapp state of the law. To apply a new
rule of criminal procedure retroactively would defeat these states'
justifiable reliance.
The Supreme Court reconciled the conflicting reliance-equity principles
by employing a three-pronged test for retroactivity. When deciding
whether to apply a new legal rule retroactively, courts would weigh: (1)
"the purpose of the [new] rule," (2) "the reliance placed upon the [old]
doctrine," and (3) "the effect [up]on the administration of justice of a
retrospective application of [the new legal rule]." 24 This test applied
equally to cases on direct and collateral review.25
Applying its three-pronged test the Linkletter Court declined to apply
Mapp retroactively2 The second and third Linkletter factors largely
consisted of the reliance considerations discussed above. The Court
reasoned that the government relied upon pre-Mapp law in gaining
convictions; to review these final convictions under Mapp would wreak
havoc on the justice system. 7 The Court also considered the purpose of
the rule announced inMapp. The Court noted that "Mapp had as its prime
purpose the enTforcement of the Fourth Amendment through the inclusion
of the exclusionary rule within its rights." In other words, the Court
concluded that the very purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter state
officials from future Fourth Amendment violations.2 9 Retroactive
application, then, could have no impact upon future Fourth Amendment
violations. In sum, all of the Linkletter factors weighed against applying
Mapp retroactively.
In Linkletter, retroactivity as a legal doctrine was a product of both
theory and practice. In theory, similarly situated parties should be treated
alike. In practice, however, such treatment threatened to overload the legal
system. It is noteworthy that the Linkletter Court, in formulating its
decision, did not rely on either the constitution or a conception of the
proper role of the judiciary. ° Instead, the Court focused on the parties
23. Linidetter, 381 U.S. at 636.
24. Id. at 636.
25. Id.; see also Stovallv. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (making no distinction between
such types of review).
26. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 640.
27. Id. at 637-38.
28. Id. at 636 (emphasis added).
29. Id.
30. See id. at 628 ("ITihere seems to be no impediment - constitutional or
hilosophical - to the use of [prospectivity] ... ."); see also L. Anita Richardson &
nard B. Mandell, Fairness Over Fortuity: Retroactivity Revisited and Revised, 1989
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to the case, addressing the issues of equity for similarly situated defendants
and the justified reliance of the government. The Court struck a balance
in favor of the government; the Linkletter test is largely a method of
determining when government reliance upon an old rule of law was
reasonable orjustifiable. Indeed, the second Linkletter factor expressly and
directly measures reliance.3' Similarly, the third factor indirectly
measures government reliance; because the government relied on the old
legal rule, significant complications arise for the administration of justice
when such reliance is undercut. In contrast the competing equity principle
did not appear either directly or indirectly in the Linkletter test. Thus, in
weighing the equity-reliance principles, Linkletter tipped the scale in favor
of reliance.
2. Griffith v. Kentucky and Teague v. Lane. The Linkletter standard
stood largely intact until two cases decided in the late 1980's.?2 In
Griffith v. Kentucky33 and Teague v. Lane' the Court made a wholesale
review of its criminal retroactivity doctrine. Both cases involved the issue
of retroactive application of the Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky,35
in which the Court determined the evidentiary showing needed to challenge
the prosecution's racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.
Griffith addressed this issue for cases on direct review, while Teague
considered the issue for cases on collateral review.
The Griffith Court scrutinized the Batson challenges of two criminal
defendants, one convicted in state court and one in federal court. Both
defendants appealed their convictions to the United States Supreme Court
on writs of certiorari, i.e., on direct review, and the Court heard the cases
in tandem? 6 The Court decided that "a new rule for the conduct of
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or
federal, pending on direct review or not yet final."' This holding
rejected the Linkletter standard, instead setting a bright-line rule for all
cases on direct review. The Court would no longer weigh the ambiguous
factors of the law's purpose, governmental reliance, and practicality.
UTAH L. REV. 11, 12 (1989) ("The Constitution does not speak to the retroactive or
prospective application of Supreme Court decisions.").
31. See supra text accompanying note 24.
32. For a discussion of retroactivity under the Linidetter regime, see John B. Corr,
Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied," 61 N.C. L. REV. 745
(1983).
33. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
34. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
35. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (overruling Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)).
36. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 320.
37. Id. at 328.
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Griffith struck the reliance-equity balance squarely in favor of the equity
principle, departing significantly from prior criminal procedure retroactivity
jurisprudence.38
The Griffith holding also had a secondary significance. As discussed
above, Linkletter relied on equity and practicality in support of its selective
prospectivity doctrine, never placing retroactivity within the framework of
either the Constitution or the role of the judiciary in our American legal
system 9 However, the Griffith Court included a constitutional basis for
its decision. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, appealed to the
proper role of Article m courts in our constitutional system ° Under the
Article I "cases and controversies" requirement, federal courts must
decide cases by applying the Court's understanding of the law at the time
the cases come before them.41 As the Court explained:
"If we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of our
best understanding of governing constitutional principles, it is difficult to
see why we should so adjudicate any case at all .... In truth, the Court's
assertion of power to disregard current law in adjudicating cases before us
[on direct review] ... is quite simply an assertion that our constitutional
function is not one of adjudication but in effect of legislation."'
For the first time, the Supreme Court recognized the larger, structural
implications of the retroactivity question. In effect, the Court was defining
its own role and considering its place within the constitutional world of
separated powers.
Two years later, in Teague, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
define further its role in the retroactivity context. The defendant in Teague
came to the Court on collateral review 3 He challenged his conviction
based on Batson, which was decided after his conviction had become final.
The Supreme Court held that new legal rules generally should not apply
38. Id. at 327-28.
39. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
40. Griffth, 479 U.S. at 322. Under Article III, the judicial power extends to "all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; ... to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party, to Controversies between two or more states .... "
U.S. CONST. art. a1, § 2 (emphasis added).
41. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322-23.
42. Id. at 323 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, 3.,
concurring)).
43. Teague, 489 U.S. at 295. Teague stood trial and was convicted in an Illinois state
court. The Illinois appellate court and state supreme court both affirmed Teague's
conviction. When the United States Supreme Court denied Teague's writ of certiorari in
1983, Teague's conviction became final. Following the Supreme Court's decision inBason
in 1986, Teague mounted a collateral attack against his conviction on a federal writ of
habeas corpus.
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retroactively to cases on collateral reviews The Court achieved this
result by narrowly construing federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Article
1l courts must operate within their congressional grant of jurisdiction.4-
The Teague Court construed the federal habeas corpus statute4 as
granting federal courts jurisdiction to review state court convictions only
under the law at the time a defendant's conviction becomes final Under
this interpretation, the Court effectively never faces the issue of
retroactivity on collateral review in criminal cases; federal courts are not
granted authority to entertain habeas corpus attacks based on assertions of
new legal rules4
The Court's general rule, however, has two exceptions. First, federal
courts may hear habeas petitions based on a new legal rule that places
'"certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of
the criminal law-making power to proscribe.' '49 In such cases, a state
cannot justly hold an individual for commission of an act the state truly
had no authority to forbid. Second, courts are to give habeas litigants the
benefit of a new legal rule that is essential to "the fundamental fairness that
must underlie a conviction or... [to] obtain[] an accurate conviction." 50
When federal courts hear cases falling into these categories, they must
apply the new legal rules retroactively. In this limited way, Teague is
consistent with Griffith: courts that properly have jurisdiction over a
criminal case asserting or seeking the benefit of a new legal rule may apply
the new rule retroactively.
44. Id. at 306-07.
45. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2140 (1990) (Article III judicial
power does not attach to courts until "they have been created and their jurisdiction
established.") (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988) (defining the Court's power to grant a writ).
47. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 306-07. This interpretation of the federal habeas corpus
statute raises a troubling question: Can Congress restrict the Supreme Court's direct review
jurisdiction to cases that do not assert novel legal theories or rules? The justices in Teague
!gnored this greater implication of their decision. Underlying the entire discussion, however,
is a question of how much Congress can constitutionally restrict the jurisdiction of Article
M1 courts. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, ThE CoNSITtruioN, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
12945 (1982); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTrrurioNAL LAW (2d ed. 1988);
Charles L. Black, The Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 841 (1975);
Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Lawrence G.
Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Appellate
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981).
48. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1734 (1991) (Teague held that "subject
only to narrow exceptions, a federal habeas court should dismiss claims based on 'new'
rules of constitutional law without reaching the merits.").
49. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692
(1971) (Harlan, L, concurring)).
50. Id. at 315.
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The Grijith language concerning Article II did not appear in Teague.
Justice Blackmun, the author of the Article I rationale in Grifflth, did not
write separately in Teague. Instead, he joined in Part I of Justice Stevens'
concurrence, which made no mention of the constitutional origins of
retroactivity. Justice White stood alone in recognizing that something more
- something of a constitutional nature -- could be at stake: "If we are
wrong in construing the reach of the habeas corpus statutes, Congress can
of course correct us; but because the Court's recent decisions dealing with
direct review appear to have constitutional underpinnings... [] correction
of our error, if error there is, lies with us, not Congress."5 ' After Teague,
the structural and constitutional origins of retroactivity, at least in the
criminal context were left unclear
B. Chevron, Smith, and Beam: Civil Retroactivity and a Return to
Constitutional Foundations
A revolution in the Court's civil retroactivity jurisprudence has been
long in arriving. Until recently, the Supreme Court has applied the
Linkletter-like balancing approach developed in Chevron Oil v. Huson.52
However, in the last two years, at the initiative of Justices Scalia, Marshall,
and Blackmun, the Court has moved toward a doctrine of full retroactivity
in civil cases. Perhaps most significant, however, is that all three justices
have appealed to the Constitution and structural concerns in making their
arguments.
1. Chevron and the Three-Factor Test. For a period of five years after
Linkletter, the Supreme Court addressed retroactivity only in the context of
constitutional criminal procedure.O3 In 1971, the Court first discussed the
viability of prospectivity in civil cases in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.s* In
Chevron, the Court reached the issue of whether a federal statute absorbed
its statute of limitations from applicable state law or whether federal courts
should supply the statute of limitations from federal common law.55 The
Court found that the outcome in Chevron was controlled by the rationale
of a prior decision, Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,56 which
held that a federal statute absorbed substantive state law on the same
51. Id. at 317 (citations omitted) (White, L, concurring).
52. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
53. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. 667 (1971); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
54. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
55. Id. at 100-05.
56. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
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point.Y Because the Chevron suit arose and was commenced before the
Court's decision in Rodrigue, the Court had to decide the retroactivity of
the Rodrigue precedent. Retroactive application of Rodrigue, and of the
state statute of limitations, would have time-barred the plaintiff's claims.
In its brief discussion of civil retroactivity, the Court made reference
to the Linkletter line of criminal cases 8 and other cases in which the
Court claimed to "have recognized the doctrine of non-retroactivity outside
the criminal area many times."' 9 From these cases, the Court developed
a Linkleuer-like three-pronged test. Under the Chevron test, prospectivity
was determined by examining: (1) whether "the decision to be applied
nonretroactively... establish[es] a new principle of law," (2) "the prior
history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether
retrospective operation will further or retard its operation," and (3) "the
inequity imposed by retroactive application."' The Chevron Court
concluded that to apply Rodrigue retroactively to bar the plaintiff's claims
violated every prong of its newly-enunciated test.6 ' This decision ushered
in the Chevron era, during which non-retroactivity became an option in
civil cases.
The Court's treatment of Chevron resembled its disposition of
Linkletter; both confronted the equity-reliance conflict, yet discussed
retroactivity without any mention of the Constitution or the proper role of
Article I courts. First, weighing in favor of retroactivity was the equity
principle that similarly situated parties should be treated alike.62 In other
words, it is inequitable to give the benefit of a new rule to the party in the
case announcing it but not to parties arriving at the courthouse door shortly
thereafter. Under this argument, justice should not rely on the mere
fortuity of a case's progress through the judicial system.
However, in tension with this equitable consideration was the concept
that courts should protect parties' reasonable reliance on current, accepted
legal rules.63 Thus, parties' settled expectations weigh against
retroactivity. In striking a balance between these competing principles, the
Supreme Court came down forcefully, as it had six years earlier in
Linkletter, on the side of reliance, settled expectations, and non-
57. Id. at 365-66.
58. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 105-06.
59. Id. at 106.
60. Id. at 106-07 (citation omitted). A decision establishes a new rule of law "either
by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an
issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Id. at 106
(citation omitted).
61. Id. at 107-08.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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retroactivity. Indeed, the first and third factors of the Chevron test
expressly seek to protect parties from the disruption of sudden changes in
the law.
2. Smith and Beam: Whither the Constitution? Rumblings of an
impending constitutional revolution in civil retroactivity doctrine, parallel
to the changes in the criminal context, did not emerge until 1990 in
American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith.' Indeed, a constitutional revolution
was not possible in an area in which the Supreme Court had not
acknowledged the influence of the Constitution. Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion in Smith applied Chevron, leaving that standard intact for
the time being. Justice Scalia, however, clearly stated a contrary position:
"prospective decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which
is to say what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be."- Like Justice
Blackmun's opinion in Griffith,66 Justice Scalia grounded his position in
Article III and a proper understanding of the role of courts thereunder' 0
Those courts exercising the Article Ell "judicial Power" must confine
themselves to "declaring what the law already is," resisting the temptation
to "creat[e] . . . law."6' 8 These postulates led Justice Scalia to the
inevitable conclusion that "since the Constitution does not conform to our
decisions, but our decisions are supposed to conform to it; the notion that
our interpretation of the Constitution in a particular decision could take
prospective form does not make sense. ' 9
Mere invocation of Article III, however, does not answer the question
of why retroactivity is inherent in the judicial power. The following
inquiry plagues any attempt at constitutional interpretation: How do we
discover the specific meaning of otherwise broad and vague constitutional
language?70 In the present context, the relevant text consists of two
simple words: "judicial Power." Any inferences regarding the inherent
authority of, or limitations on, those exercising the 'judicial Power" must
64. 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
65. Id. at 201 (Scalia, I., concurring in the judgment).
66. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328; see supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
67. Smith, 4.96 U.S. at 200-04 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
68. Id. at 201 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
69. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
70. See LAURENcE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING TmE CONsTIfON
(1991); HARRY H. WELliNGoN, INmrERPRHI1NG TnE CONsTnrmoN: THE SUPRmm COURT
AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION (1990); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels
of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1060-65 (1990).
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come from outside the text. In Smith, Justice Scalia barely identified his
extra-textual sources, making only apassing, unexplained reference to tradition. 1
In a concurring opinion in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia7
Justice Scalia answered the interpretive question he had raised just a year
earlier in Smith. Beam addressed the retroactivity of the Court's decision
in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,73 regarding the negative commerce
clause and certain state taxing statutes. The Bacchus Court applied its
holding to the parties before it; thus, the Beam Court was limited to the
choices of full retroactivity, pure retroactivity, and selective prospectivity.
In Beam, Justice Scalia argued that the proper understanding of the
"judicial Power" must be sought from "our common law tradition... as
it was understood when the Constitution was enacted."74 According to
this common law understanding, judges only wield the power"'to say what
the law is."'15 If judges attempted to do more, to move into the
proverbial realm of making law, judges would "alter in a fundamental way
the assigned balance of responsibility and power among the three
Branches.76 As discussed above, full retroactivity is consistent with the
limited judicial role of finding law. 7 Therefore, Justice Scalia concluded,
only full retroactivity would confine judges to the "judicial Power";
anything less would depart from the proper understanding of that term and
skew the balance of power in our constitutional system." Justice Scalia,
however, gained only two other votes (Justices Marshall and Blackmun) in
support of his constitutional theory of retroactivity. 9
Justices Souter and Stevens were the other two votes supporting the
judgment in Beam. Justice Souter, author of the plurality opinion joined
by Justice Stevens, rested his decision on a conception of retroactivity as
a choice-of-law question.' Justice Souter saw retroactivity as posing a
choice between an old legal rule and a new legal rule. In analyzing the
question, Justice Souter used the twin principles of equity and reliance
71. Smith, 496 U.S. at 201 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803))(Scalia, I., concurring in the judgment).
72. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
73. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
74. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2450 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
75. Id. at 2450-51 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177) (Scalia, J., concuning
in the judgment).
76. Id. at 2451 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia has consistently
advocated a strict separation of powers among the three branches of government. See, e.g.,
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-734 (1988) (Scalia, I., dissenting).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
78. Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2450-51 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
79. Id. at 2450 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
80. Id. at 2441-48.
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upon which both Linkletter and Chevron were predicated.81 Justice
Souter, however, reached a conclusion contrary to that found in those two
cases. He largely dismissed the reliance principle on the belief that the
"applicability of rules of law are not to be switched on and off according
to individual. hardship." Instead, he relied on "principles of equality and
stare decisis here prevailing over any claim based on a Chevron ...
analysis.' ' 3 The only limit Justice Souter placed on this equitable
principle was the judicial system's need for finality." Justice Souter
concluded that equity foreclosed the option of selective prospectivity, but
refused to "speculate as to the bounds or propriety of pure
prospectivity.'7
After Beam, civil retroactivity remains uncertain. In Beam, fivejustices voted to reject selective prospectivity in civil cases. The Court also
had three firm votes to reject full prospectivity: Justices Scalia, Marshall
and Blackmun; Justices Souter and Stevens may eventually provide
additional votes. Justice Souter's strong support of the equity principle in
analyzing retroactivity, while perhaps not persuasive or desirable,a signals
his implicit rejection of the reliance principle. This rejection of the reliance
principle undercuts the entire basis of Chevron and, therefore, may provide
the needed votes to kill any form of prospectivity in civil cases.
Conversely, the equity principle loses its strength in the context of full
prospectivity Similarly situated litigants receive the same treatment; all
litigants are denied the benefit of the new rule. Since the equity-reliance
approach relies so heavily upon an individual justice's balancing of those
81. See supra notes 31, 60-62. Those two cases struck the balance in favor of the
parties' reliance interests and settled expectations.
82. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448.
83. Id. at 2446.
84. Id. at 2446-47.
85. Id. at 2A48. Of course, since pure yrospectivity was not at issue in Bean, any
discussion of the topic was merely a dictum. Justice Souter indicates that such a discussion
is inevitable given the divergent opinions inBeam. Indeed, Justice White castigated Justice
Souter for this language concerning pure prospectivity. As Justice White argued, to refuse
expressly to speculate in such a way is to suggest that a day would soon come when the
Court should and will consider the issue. According to Justice White, this suggestion was
bothersome because of its implicit assertion that pure prospectivity was an open question
instead of an issue previously settled by Chevron. Id. at 2448-49 (White, J., concurring in
the judgment).
86. Elsewhere, this author has argued against the "equity-reliance" approach to
retroactivity. See McGreal, supra note 9. As evidenced by the inconsistency between the
Chevron decision and Souter's Beam opinion, the outcome of any balancing of the equity-
reliance factors depends upon the weight an individual justice places upon each factor.
Justice Scalia's Article III approach has the twin advantages of contributing to the proper
constitutional definition of the judicial role and bringing a degree of certainty to the area
of retroactivity.
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principles, we must wait until the issue of full prospectivity arises to see
whether the Justices will complete a civil retroactivity revolution.
III. RETROACTrvrrY IN THE ALASKA SUPREmE COURT
A. The Roots of Retroactivity
The Alaska Supreme Court first considered the possibility of
prospective application of a new legal rule three years before the United
States Supreme Court's Linkletter opinion. In City of Fairbanks v.
Schaible,s' the court addressed the city's claim of immunity from liability
for damages arising from a firefighter's negligent rescue attempt. The
former District Court for the Territory of Alaska had determined immunity
questions by distinguishing between governmental and proprietary
functions performed by the city.8 If the plaintiff's claim arose from
performance of a governmental function, then the city was immune from
liability. The territorial district court had held previously that a municipal
fire department performed a governmental function! 9
In Schaible, the Alaska Supreme Court reconsidered the governmental-
proprietary function distinction. The court ultimately discarded the
distinction, holding that a city "which maintains a fire department, may be
held liable for injuries resulting from negligence connected with the
department's fire-fighting activities." 90 Nonetheless, this holding did not
dispose of the case before the court.
In a brief paragraph, the court considered whether its new rule
regarding municipal immunity should apply to the parties in the case.
Noting that municipalities likely had relied on the decisions of the
territorial district court, the court reasoned that pure prospectivity would
"avoid hardship on the municipalities."9' Nevertheless, the court
concluded that: (1) the new rule should apply to the parties in Schiable; but
(2) in future cases, the new rule would apply "only to actions arising out
of occurrences after the date of this opinion." Thus, the court applied
a form of selective prospectivity based on a reliance rationale a full three
years before the United States Supreme Court decided Linkletter. Absent
87. 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1962).
88. See, e.g., Tapscott v. Page, 17 Alaska 507 (D. Alaska 1958); City of Fairbanks v.
Gilbertson, 16 Alaska 590 (D. Alaska 1957); Carr v. City of Anchorage, 114 F. Supp. 439
(D. Alaska 1953).
89. See Gilbertson, 16 Alaska at 594.
90. Schaible, 375 P.2d at 208.
91. Id. at 211.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
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from the court's discussion, however, was any reference to the competing
principle of equity for similarly situated parties.
B. Criminal Procedure: Clinging to Linkletter
1. Applying Federal Law: Its Erratic Outcomes. The Alaska Supreme
Court did not revisit the issue of retroactivity until after the United States
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Linkletter v. Walker.93 Beginning
with Martinez v. State,4 the court decided a string of seven criminal
retroactivity cases in which it encountered the L'nkletter test for questions
of federal constitutional rights and adopted that test for questions of state
constitutional criminal procedure. The first four cases applied federal
retroactivity principles derived from United States Supreme Court
precedent.95 The remaining three cases involved state law and, thus, the
Alaska Suprame Court was free to formulate its own retroactivity
principles.
96
In Martinez, the appellant argued that his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel had been violated when he was not appointed counsel immediately
upon his arrest.97 Much of the court's analysis in Martinez depended on
the retroactive effect given to Miranda v. Arizona and Escobedo v.
Illinois,99 both of which had extended the rights of the accused under the
United States Constitution. While Miranda and Escobedo applied their
holdings to the defendants in the two cases, the extent of their retroactivity
was not clear until Johnson v. New Jersey.100 Applying the Linkletter
test, the Johnson Court held that Miranda and Escobedo would apply only
to cases in which trial had begun after the date of the decisions. 01' In
essence, the Johnson Court applied a form of selective prospectivity.
In Martinez, the Alaska Supreme Court applied the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Johnson. Under the Johnson date-of-trial
approach, Escobedo, but not Miranda, applied retroactively to the litigants
in Martinez. The Martinez holding illustrates the inconsistency attendant
93. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
94. 423 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1967).
95. Fresneda v. State, 458 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1969); Roberts v. State, 453 P.2d 898(Alaska 1969); Soolook v. State, 447 P.2d 55 (Alaska 1968); Martinez v. State, 423 P.2d
700 (Alaska 1967).
96. Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d 946 (Alaska 1971); Judd v. State, 482 P.2d 273(Alaska 1971); Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1970).
97. Martinez, 423 P.2d at 704.
98. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
99. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
100. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
101. Id. at 733.
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to selective prospectivity as applied in Johnson. A judge's trial calendar
should not determine the rights of an accused. If reliance were the interest
the Court intended to protect, the logical date for prospective application
would be the date of the government's alleged violation of those rights, i.e.,
the date the government actually relied on a particular legal norm. Instead,
by choosing the date of trial, the Supreme Court adopted a purely arbitrary
date for retroactivity; trial is a date with little or no relation to the
government's reliance interest. Under this rule, the defendant is given a
"window of new rights," a period of time between the government's
offending conduct and the commencement of trial in which new
constitutional protections could arise.
Soolook v. State,1" decided one year after Martinez, further illustrates
the weakness of the Johnson rule. Soolook was arrested for murder in
early 1966. Before arrest he was warned of his right to remain silent and
his right to an attorney. Nevertheless, Soolook twice confessed to the
murder, once to police and once to the district attorney. These confessions
took place several months before the Supreme Court's decision inMiranda,
in which the Court established the requirement that detailed warnings be
given to an accused. The police, therefore, had relied on the pre-Miranda
state of the law which required only that a defendant's confession be
voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. 1' However, because
Soolook's case came to trial after the decision in Miranda, Soolook was
entitled to the benefit of the Miranda decision. Soolook's two confessions
were scrutinized under Miranda despite the government's good faith
reliance on pre-Miranda law at the time of his confession.1°4 Cases like
Soolook illustrate how imperfectly the Supreme Court's date-of-trial
selective prospectivity rule actually protects the government's reliance
interest.
The Alaska Supreme Court next applied United States Supreme Court
retroactivity precedent to criminal federal precedent in Roberts v. State.1°5
In Roberts, a third party accidentally overheard an incriminating phone
conversation involving the accused. The third party had access to this
conversation because the phone company had mistakenly connected her
line with the accused's home line. This mistaken connection violated the
Federal Communications Act ("FCA")."'6 The Supreme Court had held
102. 447 P.2d 55 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 850 (1969).
103. See, e.g., Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S.
737(1966).
104. Sooloo, 447 P.2d at 59. The court nevertheless deemed Soolook's confession
admissible. Id. at 61.
105. 453 P.2d 898 (Alaska 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1022 (1970).
106. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1988).
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in Lee v. Florida07 that a federal exclusionary rule prohibited the
admission of evidence gained in violation of the FCA.l °a In Fuller v.
Alaska,l°9 however, the United States Supreme Court had limited Lee to
cases that went to trial after the date of the Lee decision.1 °
Consequently, the Alaska Supreme Court had to once again apply an
illogical, trial date-based form of selective prospectivity to determine an
accused's rights under the federal Constitution.' Because Roberts went
to trial before the United States Supreme Court decided Lee, he did not
retroactively receive the benefit of that rule. 2 Thus, in Roberts, the
date-of-trial worked in favor of the government, upholding the state's
reliance on the pre-Lee status of the law. As Martinez and Soolook clearly
illustrate, however, the State does not always win this lottery of the trial
court calendar.
In Fresneda v. State,"3 the Alaska Supreme Court addressed the
retroactivity of the rule in Chimel v. California,114 an issue not yet
decided by 1he United States Supreme Court.1 5 The court held that
Chimel applied "to cases pending on direct review in this court as of the
date of the Chimel decision."" 6 In reaching this holding, the court did
not specifically consider the Linkletter factors. Instead, it utilized the
retroactivity approach articulated by Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in
Desist v. United States."7 In Desist, Justice Harlan's analysis advocated
retroactivity :for all decisions on direct review, 18 a position similar to that
later adopted by the Supreme Court in Griffith.1 9 Although the court's
brief reference to Harlan's dissent signalled a possible departure from the
Linkletter approach, the court never returned to this type of retroactivity
analysis.
107. 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
108. Id. at 386-87.
109. 393 U.S. 80 (1968).
110. Id. at 81.
111. A date-of-trial rule arbitratily sets the date of prospective effect and thwarts the
government's good faith reliance on existing legal rules.
112. Roberts, 453 P.2d at 904.
113. 458 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1969).
114. 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding that police can search an arrestee and the area in her
immediate control incident to a lawful arrest).
115. Fresneda, 458 P.2d at 143 & n.8.
116. Id.
117. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
118. Fresneda, 458 P.2d at 143 & n.128 (citing Desist, 394 U.S. at 257-59 (Harlan, I.,
dissenting)).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 33-42.
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2. The Linkletter Standard Adopted. In Martinez, Soolook, Roberts,
and Fresneda, the Alaska Supreme Court applied federal law and, thus, did
not address the appropriate retroactivity doctrine for state precedent. These
cases, however, influenced the Alaska Supreme Court in later state law
cases. This section traces the court's adoption of the Linkletter retroactivity
test
In Gray v. State,' the court addressed the retroactivity of its
decision in Speidel v. Alaska,121 which granted an accused the right to be
present at a pre-sentencing conference. Although the court acknowledged
Linkletter and its progeny,12 it adopted a distinct two-part test for
analyzing the retroactivity issue, which emphasized "(1) the purpose to be
served by the rule; [and] (2) the effect on the administration of justice of
a retroactive application of the new rule."' This test did not expressly
consider "the reliance placed upon the [old] doctrine,"' 2 the factor
supporting prospective application in Linkletter. In its place, the court
added a practical consideration under the "administration of justice" prong:
"whether there were a substantial number of convictions based on the
criminal procedural law before the new rule was laid down."'
' 2-
Applying this rule, the Gray court held that Speidel should be applied
prospectively."
An "administration of justice" criterion extends beyond the reliance
rationale which supported prospectivity in Linkletter. This criterion
includes an element of reliance in that a retrial based on retroactivity upsets
the government's settled expectations placed in the validity of the first
prosecution. However, this criterion also includes an efficiency
consideration with respect to the practical effect that retrials place on a
court's caseload. A substantial number of petitions to set aside convictions
could paralyze the courts and disrupt or even halt the administration of
justice. In holding that Speidel should be applied prospectively, the Gray
court relied on this efficiency rationale, referring to the "number of
convictions" the Speidel rule would disturb.' 7
While not directly addressing the reliance factor, the Gray court's
decision was consistent with a reliance rationale. As discussed previously,
the United States Supreme Court tied prospective application to the date
120. 463 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1970).
121. 460 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1969).
122. Gray, 463 P.2d at 912 n.35.
123. Id. at 913 (emphasis added).
124. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636 (emphasis added).
125. Gray, 463 P.2d at 913.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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trial commenced. This rule created a window of rights where the
government's reliance interests could be defeated." In Gray, however,
the court tied prospectivity to the government conduct complained of, i.e.,
the pre-sentencing conference. 12 The court concluded that Speidel
applied "only to presentence conferences held after the date of the Speidel
decision.""' ° This rule recognized that the government conduct, not the
arbitrary commencement date of trial, marks the accurate time for
measuring governmental reliance on a legal rule.
A year later, in Judd v. State,'3' the Alaska Supreme Court adopted
the full Linkletter test in what remains its most extensive discussion of
criminal retroactivity. The Judd court addressed the retroactivity of
Fresneda, in which the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted and extended the
United States Supreme Court's rule announced in Chimel.'3 Judd
presents a curious, hybrid case. In cases where the Alaska Supreme Court
merely applies a federal constitutional precedent, federal law has supplied
the relevant retroactivity rules. In Judd, however, the court addressed the
retroactivity of its own decision in Fresneda, a case in which the Alaska
Supreme Court interpreted and extended the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Chimel. In Judd, the Alaska Supreme Court applied its own
state rules of retroactivity. The Judd court's treatment of Fresneda,
therefore, suggests that although federal precedent controls the application
of federal retroactivity rules, state precedent which interprets and extends
federal precedent is subject to state retroactivity rules.133
The Judd court began its analysis of state retroactivity principles just
as the Linkletter Court had in the federal context, stating that "there is no
constitutional requirement of retroactive application of decisions; the
[Alaska Supreme] Court is free to announce a decision as retroactive or
prospective."'' 4 In support of this proposition, the court recited the
holdings of Linkletter and its progeny." The court noted the United
States Supreme Court's inconsistency in identifying the date for
prospective application of a new legal rule."3 In applying Escobedo and
128. See discussion supra p. 29.
129. Gray, 463 P.2 at 913.
130. Id.
131. 482 P.2d 273 (Alaska 1971).
132. Fresne&j applied the Chimel decision to an issue arising under the Alaska
Constitution. Fresneda, 458 P.2d at 143 ("he search... went beyond the limits set forth
in Chimel."). See supra note 114.
133. See Judd, 482 P.2d at 276-80.
134. Id. at 276.
135. Id.
136. Id; see supra text accompanying notes 100-101.
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Miranda, the date of trial controlled,l ' while in other cases, the Supreme
Court chose the date of the government's offending conduct' or the date
illegally obtained evidence was introduced at trial.139
Next, the Alaska Supreme Court thrust itself into an evaluation of the
competing equity and reliance factors that have given the Supreme Court
so much difficulty."4 The court noted the common law doctrine of pure
retroactivity as based on the "find-make' distinction.14' The court
concluded that the Supreme Court had adopted the "contrary view that if
justifiable reliance had been placed upon an earlier judicial decision by
those persons affected by it, the courts were required to consider this factor
in determining whether subsequent changes in the law would be
retroactive."' 42  The court then adopted the full three-prong test
articulated by the Supreme Court in Linkletter.'43 The court further noted
that Gray's two-prong analysis was consistent with the holding because the
reliance factor was not necessary to the resolution of Gray.'
Applying the Linkletter test, the court concluded that Fresneda applied
only to searches conducted after the date of the Chimel decision.' 4 In
framing this holding, the court resolved its earlier quandary regarding the
proper date of prospectivity. By adopting the date-of-conduct approach,
the court signalled its continued recognition and support of the reliance
rationale.
The Judd court focused mainly on the reliance principle in adopting the
prospectivity analysis of Linkletter. However, the court added an
additional rationale, expressing concern with respect to public confidence
in the law:
ITihe public [has] relied upon the previous statements of the law, and...
the great impact of and respect for the law in our society is based on such
acceptance by the public generally. A change for the future can be
digested but the application of a new interpretation to past conduct which
137. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
138. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (considering the retroactivity of
the decisions in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967)).
139. See, e.g., Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968) (addressing the retroactivity of Lee
v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968)).
140. Judd, 482 P.2d at 278-79.
141. Id. at 277; see supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
142. Judd, 482 P.2d at 277 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 278.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 279.
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was accepted by previous judicial decisions leads us to confusion and a
hesitancy to accept any theory except one of gamesmanship with
corresponding disrespect for our whole system of laws!
14
If the stability of legal norms cannot be trusted and if the rules of the game
can be changed ex post, public confidence and trust in the law is eroded.
Since law relies heavily upon public acceptance for its validity and
viability, a legal doctrine that threatens this acceptance must be disfavored.
This argument is a logical corollary to the reliance principle; defeating
justifiable reliance engenders distrust of and frustration with the legal
system.
1 7
In a concurring opinion, Justice Rabinowitz assailed the majority's
adoption of prospectivity, expressing "geminous reservations as to whether
this court possesse[d] the authority to decree, or as a matter of policy
should hold, that a constitutional decision in a criminal case need not be
given retroactive application."'14 He observed that the majority found
"reliance to be the controlling criterion regarding prospective or retroactive
application of constitutional adjudications."'149 Justice Rabinowitz set
forth three arguments against prospectivity: equal protection, "the
government's dereliction," and the efficacy of apracticality-based argument
under Alaska law.'5 First, according to Justice Rabinowitz, prospectivity
discriminates among criminal defendants based upon the timing of their
cases. While this arbitrary classification would not constitute a suspect
classification for equal protection purposes,' 5' it does work a denial of an
express constitutional right: the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Thus, it can be argued that the classification should be
subject to strict scrutiny under the fundamental rights strain of equal
protection. 52 Although Justice Rabinowitz did not make this argument
explicitly, it seems implicit in an invocation of equal protection.
Justice Rabinowitz also criticized the Fresneda decision for applying
Chimel only to cases on direct review at the time of the Chimel decision.
He noted that Judd would have been on direct review at that time but for
146. Id. at 278-79.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 280 (Rabinowitz, J, concurring).
149. Id. at 282 n.5 (Rabinowitz, I., concurring).
150. Id. at 281 (Rabinowilz, J., concurring).
151. Suspect classes under equal protection analysis are generally limited to race,
national orign and alienage. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONS'XTrUrIONAL LAW
§§ 16-6 to 16-13, at 1451-66 (2d ed. 1988).
152. See id. ji 16-7, at 1454.
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delays caused by the state.1 53 He found it unfair to penalize a criminal
defendant for delays attributable to the prosecution 54
Third, Justice Rabinowitz addressed the Gray court's discussion of the
practical difficulties of applying criminal procedure guarantees
retroactively.' 55 Many defendants would have to be retried, placing an
extra burden on the legal system. Justice Rabinowitz noted, however, that
in Baker v. City of Fairbanks' the court had rejected such "expediency
oriented decision making."'1 7 The Baker court rejected an expediency
rationale because it "would place the individual constitutional right in a
secondary position, to be effectuated only if it accorded with
expediency."'  For this reason, Justice Rabinowitz rejected expediency-
based justifications for the prospective application of constitutional rights.
After Judd, Alaska followed the Linkletter approach to the retroactivity
of criminal precedents. Judd's adoption of Linkletter rested on two
grounds: the government's strong reliance interest and Linkletter's weight
as persuasive federal precedent In the absence of constitutional restraints,
such as those advanced by Justice Rabinowitz or Justice Scalia, the court
struck a balance between the equity-reliance principles. In that balance, the
weight fell consistently with then-current federal precedent, in favor of
reliance.
Only four months later, the court again addressed the question of
retroactivity in criminal cases. This time, in Rutherford v. State,' the
court split over the proper application of the Judd retroactivity test."6
The Rutherford court also expanded upon the core considerations under
each prong of the Judd test.
Rutherford involved the retroactive effect of the court's decision in
Glasgow v. State,'6' which overruled Goss v. State.' Goss previously
held that an accused's right to a speedy trial was waived if not
asserted.163 The Rutherford court began its retroactivity analysis by
153. Judd, 482 P.2d at 281 (Rabinowitz, I., concurring).
154. Id. (Rabinowitz, L, concurring).
155. See supra text accompanying note 127.
156. 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).
157. Judd, 482 P.2d at 281 n.3 (Rabinowitz, L, concun-ing).
158. Baker, 471 P.2d at 394 (citation omitted).
159. 486 P.2d 946 (Alaska 1971).
160. See id. at 956 (Connor & Rabinowitz, J3., joining, dissenting in part) ('It is only
in the use of the [Judd] criteria that we differ.").
161. 469 P.2d 682 (Alaska 1970).
162. 390 P.2d 220 (Alaska), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 (1964).
163. Goss, 390 P.2d at 222.
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setting forth the Judd three-prong test and explaining its Supreme Court
lineage." The court then examined the Judd test, first noting that "a
review of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States dealing
with retroaclivity questions indicates that the starting point in analysis is
the purpose criterion."' Yet again, the court's retroactivity analysis
looked to the Supreme Court for guidance and, it seems, highly persuasive
authority.
Next, the Rutherford court specifically addressed the purpose criterion.
The court, again citing United States Supreme Court precedent, identified
a general rule that "[wihere the purpose of the new rule is primarily related
to the integrity of the verdict, the application thereof has generally been
extended to all cases."' 1  Where the newly prohibited government
conduct affects the fact-finding process, the resultant inaccuracy increases
the likelihood that the jury will render an improper verdict, possibly
resulting in the conviction of an innocent person. In this way,
constitutional criminal rights are valued in relation to their effect on the
trial process and not as ends in themselves. This rationale allowed the
Rutherford court to distinguish Judd, because "[t]he problem in search and
seizure cases is not the reliability of the evidence obtained, but rather the
constitutional propriety of the methods used by the investigating authority
to obtain it. '
164. Rutherford, 486 P2d at 952.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971) (opinion of White, J.)).
167. Id. at 953. This holding makes sense in light of the Supreme Court's application
of the Mapp exclusionary rule. That rule addresses the admissibility of evidence obtained
by a search made in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court views the
purpose of the evtclusionary rule as the deterrence of improper police conduct United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The interests protected by the Fourth Amendment are the
accused's privacy interests in her person and her property, as opposed to the interest in
protecting against having unreliable evidence admitted at trial. Indeed, the evidence
excluded is often quite reliable and atimes may be dispositive of guilt or innocence. The
focus of exclusion , must be the police conduct en exclusion of evidence does not
deter police conduct, the rule does not apply. For example, when the police rely in good
faith on a defective warrant, exclusion of the evidence obtained would not deter future
police misconduct. Because the police were unaware, a court may reason, they were not
engaging in deterrable misconduct. See id. at 919-20.
Similarly, when the court decides the retroactivity of a new criminal rule, the court
must identify the underlying purpose of that rule. If the reasonable search and seizure
requirement focuses on deterring police misconduct, then retroactivity will not (and cannot)
achieve that end. The police will act in good faith reliance on current law, not tempering
their actions in the face of possible changes of the law, regardless of retroactive application
of a legal rule. Retroactivity will not change police behavior and, thus, does not achieve
the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment. If, on the other hand, the purpose of the new
legal rule is to increase the accuracy of criminal verdicts, then the state can achieve that
purpose by providing the accused with a new trial preserving the newly announced
safeguards.
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Turning to the rule announced in Glasgow, the Rutherford court first
found that the speedy trial guarantee served many purposes, one of which
was to enhance the accuracy of criminal verdicts. 16s Second, the court
dismissed any governmental reliance on the old rule in Goss.1" Indeed,
the court suggested that any reliance on Goss was unjustified because
several Supreme Court precedents had cast doubt upon its continuing
viability:
Reliance upon the holding in Goss would be a valid consideration only to
the extent that such reliance was justified. Prior to our decision in
Glasgow, the United States Supreme Court... substantially undermined
the theoretical validity of the Goss holding. Although Glasgow was
decided on state constitutional grounds, we relied heavily upon the
language of [the Supreme Court] ... [it is simply difficult to see how any
actual reliance upon Goss could be considered to have been justifiable. 17°
Third, the court minimized the effect of the Glasgow rule on the
administration of justice.' 1' The court concluded, therefore, that Glasgow
must, at the very least, be applied to the litigants in Rutherford.172
The dissenting opinion co-authored by Justices Connor and Rabinowitz
illustrates the malleability of the Judd analysis. 173 The dissenters faulted
the majority on its analysis of each factor in the Judd test. First, the
dissenters dismissed the assumption that delay rendered all trials
unreliable.'14 The dissent also argued that governmental reliance on the
old Goss rule "was probably much greater than the majority opinion
implie[d]."'175 The dissent did not view Supreme Court precedent as
clearly fatal to Goss, at least not to the extent that official reliance on that
168. Rutherford, 486 P.2d at 954.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 954-55. This language conforms with the court's insistence elsewhere that
it must at the very least protect federal constitutional rights and may construe the Alaska
Constitution more broadly than the federal constitution. See Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340,
342 (Alaska 1969). The Supreme Court had expanded the federal constitutional right to a
speedy trial beyond the rule in Goss. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Thus,
the Alaska Supreme Court was required to give at least as much protection as the federal
constitutional rule. See Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970)("[W]e must enforce the minimum constitutional standards imposed upon us by the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
171. Rutherford, 486 P.2d at 955 (holding that retroactive application of Glasgow would
not "empty the jails').
172. Id. at 952 & n.20, 955 & n.27. The government attempted to bring the defendant
in Rutherford to trial over a fourteen-month period. The court decided Glasgow during this
period. Although the Rutherford court did not so state, its opinion appears to limit its
holding to cases where Glasgow was decided during the delay in trial. See id. at 952 n.20.
173. See id. at 956-59 (Connor & Rabinowitz, JL, joining, dissenting in part).
174. Id. at 956-57 (Connor & Rabinowitz, JL, joining, dissenting in part) ("[lit cannot
be safely assumed that mere lapse of time will necessarily render convictions unreliable.').
175. Id. at 957 (Connor & Rabinowilz, J., joining, dissenting in part).
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rule was unjustified.176 Finally, the dissent suggested that "the most
serious aspect of the majority's opinion will be its implications for the
administration of justice,"'177 stating that retroactivity would "bestow an
unexpected windfall upon a number of ill-deserving convicted felons."'
178
The majority and dissent in Rutherford arrived at opposite conclusions
on each of the three Judd factors. The Judd court foreshadowed such
uncertainty in applying the three-part test when it took solace "in the fact
that the law review writers have the same problem that we have."' 79
Indeed, that court described retroactivity as "a value judgment" with the
court's task as "making the necessary policy decisions."' Despite these
difficulties, Linkletter, in the form of Judd, was in Alaska jurisprudence to
stay.
3. Judd Applied. In the period between Rutherford and the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Grifflth, the Alaska Supreme Court
applied the udd standard in eight cases. This section briefly sketches the
court's holdings in these cases as they relate to the application and
development of the Judd test.
In Lauderdale v. State,' the court announced a new rule that an
individual charged with driving while intoxicated has a right to examine
the components of the breathalyzer unit used to determine the driver's
blood-alcoho[ level. The court held that refusal of this right denies the
accused's due process right to a fair trial' and violates the Alaska Rules
of Criminal Procedure.1' The court then addressed the retroactive
application of its decision. The court first found that the purpose of the
new rule was to ensure a fair trial.'8 While this factor was given
virtually dispositive weight in Rutherford, the Lauderdale court found that
the next two factors in the Judd test weighed heavily against retroactive
application. The court noted that the police likely had relied on the prior
law and had in good faith routinely discarded the disposable parts of the
breathalyzer tests.'5 The court also considered that "many hundreds, if
176. Id. at 957-58 (Connor & Rabinowitz, JJ., joining, dissenting in part).
177. Id. at 958 (footnote omitted) (Connor & Rabinowitz, 1., joining, dissenting in part).
178. Id. (Connor & Rabinowitz, L, joining, dissenting in part).
179. Judd, 482 P.2d at 279.
180. Id. at 278.
181. 548 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1976).
182. Id. at 381.
183. Id. at 380, 382; see ALASKA R. CRud. P. 16(b)(7) (mandating disclosure to an
accused).
184. Lauderdale, 548 P.2d at 383.
185. Id.
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not thousands" of convictions would be upset by retroactive application of
the Lauderdale decision.'8
After weighing these competing factors under the Judd analysis, the
Lauderdale court concluded that "the rule we have adopted here will be
applied mainly prospectively.' '1n Significantly, the court qualified its
holding with the word "mainly." The court held that its decision would
apply differently to three classes of cases: (1) prospectively "to those cases
where breathalyzer tests have been administered after the date of this
opinion"; (2) retroactively to the petitioners in the Lauderdale case itsel,
and (3) retroactively "[t]o cases pending in the courts which have not been
completed prior to the date of this opinion, and where requests or motions
for production.., have been made prior to the date of this opinion, or are
made after the date of this opinion."'8 The Lauderdale court gave no
indication of why it reached this result Despite the language of
prospectivity, when the three classes are aggregated, the Lauderdale court
effectively opted for full retroactivity, along the lines of Griffith and
Teague. In other words, the Lauderdale court applied the new rule to all
cases not final as of the date that the new rule was announced.
Nonetheless, several questions remained after Lauderdale. Why did
the court ostensibly pick and choose who would receive the benefit of the
Lauderdale decision instead of openly adopting a full retroactivity rule?
Would a full retroactivity rule guide future decisions? The court found that
it had great, if not absolute, discretion to mold a flexible rule of
retroactivity based on the facts of the particular case before it:
"A state supreme court has unfettered discretion to apply aparticular ruling
either purely prospectively, purely retroactively, or partially retroactively,
limited only 'by the juristic philosophy of the judges ... their conceptions
of law, its origin and nature.' The decision is not a matter of law, but a
determination based on weighing the merits and demerits of each
case."
189
Thus, the Lauderdale court did not adopt a bright-line rule as the United
States Supreme Court had done in Teague and Griffith. While the
Rutherford decision had indicated that certain considerations, such as anew
rule's purpose to ensure a fair trial, would be dispositive of the retroactivity
issue, the Lauderdale court adopted an absolute balancing test, with the
court free to weigh the Judd factors and fashion its own case-specific
conception of the appropriate retroactivity rule.
186. Id.
187. Id. (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 383-84.
189. Id. at 382 (emphasis added) (quoting Warwick v. Alaska, 548 P.2d 384, 393
(Alaska 1976)).
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In Gordon v. State,1'9 the court mechanically applied the Judd test
to its decision in State v. Buckalew,'9' which forbade judges from
participating in the plea bargaining process. In Gordon, the court held that
the Buckalew decision should be applied only prospectively. The court
based its decision upon the potential effects of retroactive application on
the administration of justice.'9 The court analyzed the "administration
of justice" criterion by considering two distinct factors: the number of prior
convictions affected by the new rule and the difficulty in determining the
amount of prejudice to each defendant.19' The court held that each factor
weighed heavily against retroactive application of the Buckalew
holding.' 4
In Cruse v. State1 95 and Prenesti v. State,196 the court summarily
concluded that prospective application was appropriate for the holding in
Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage 97 Oveson announced a new rule
applicable to the appeal of criminal cases in which the defendant pleaded
nolo contendere 93 The decision required parties in such cases to
stipulate with trial court approval that the issue reserved for appeal would
be dispositive of the whole case.199 In brief footnotes, the Cruse and
Prenesti decisions summarily stated that Oveson applied prospectively only
to pleas entered after the date of the Oveson opinion.2°
The court in State v. Glass ("Glass IJ")2o analyzed the Judd factors
by appealing to the distinction previously announced inRutherford between
rules enhancing the fairness of trial and rules furthering other purposes.
Glass II addressed a new evidentiary rule excluding certain warrantless
electronic recordings of an accused's conversations. The electronic
surveillance rule served to deter the police from unwarranted invasions of
an individual's privacy. The court noted, as discussed above in
190. 577 P.2d 701 (Alaska 1978).
191. 561 P.2d 289 (Alaska 1977).
192. Gordon, 577 P.2d at 706 ("The impact on the administration of justice... is the
most important factor here."). The court applied Buckalew to pleas taken after the date of
that decision. Id.
193. Id. (citing Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897, 913 (Alaska 1970)).
194. Id.
195. 584 P.2d 1141 (Alaska 1978).
196. 594 P.2d 63 (Alaska 1979).
197. 574 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1978).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 803 n.4.
200. Cruse, 584 P.2d at 1144 n.3; Prenesti, 594 P.2d at 64 n.1.
201. 596 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1979).
202. Id. at 14.
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connection with Rutherford, 3 that retroactive application of the rule
could not deter police misconduct occurring prior to the date of the
decision.m Thus, the Glass II court opted to apply the new rle
prospectively. In dissent, Justice Rabinowitz urged the court to adopt
a retroactivity rule like that employed in Fresneda v. State.2 6  In
Fresneda, the court applied the rule announced in Chimel v. Californiam
to all cases pending on direct review as of the date of the Chimel decision.
In Gonzales v. State,08 the defendant petitioned the court to
reconsider its retroactivity decision in Glass H and to adopt Justice
Rabinowitz's dissent The Gonzales court refused to so hold,' and
Justice Rabinowitz renewed his objection to the decision against retroactive
application 21°
Six years after the Gonzales decision, then-Chief Justice Rabinowitz
had an opportunity to write for the court on the retroactivity issue in
Farleigh v. Municipality of Anchorage.2 xl Farleigh involved the
retroactive application of the Alaska Court of Appeals' decision in
Municipality of Anchorage v. Serrano.212 Serrano held that the state
violates an accused's due process rights when the prosecution does not
make reasonable efforts to allow the defendant an opportunity to verify the
results of a breathalyzer test2 13 Chief Justice Rabinowitz set forth the
Judd test as the controlling retroactivity analysis.214 In analyzing the
Judd factors, the Chief Justice announced a bright-line rule based on a
proposition originally announced in Rutherford: "where a new rule serves
to ensure defendants a fair trial, it must be retroactively applied at least to
any case which was not finally disposed of at the time the rule was
announced, provided that the defendant raised the point in the trial
court" 215 In a footnote, Chief Justice Rabinowitz suggested that the
203. See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text.
204. Glass II, 596 P.2d at 14.
205. Id. at 15.
206. Id. at 15-16 (citing Fresneda v. State, 458 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1969)) (Rabinowitz,
I., dissenting). For a discussion of Fresneda, see supra notes 113-116 and accompanying
text.
207. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
208. 608 P.2d 23 (Alaska 1980).
209. Id. at 24-25.
210. Id. at 26-27 (Rabinowitz, I., dissenting).
211. 728 P.2d 637 (Alaska 1986).
212. 649 P.2d 256 (Alaska CL App. 1982).
213. Id. at 259.
214. Farleigh, 728 P.2d at 639.
215. Id. at 640-41 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying
note 166.
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court should consider the next two Judd factors - reasonable reliance and
the efficient administration of justice -- only in deciding whether the new
legal rule should receive broader retroactive applicaion 16
In Farleigh, Chief Justice Rabinowitz restructured the retroactivity
analysis; the court's inquiry into the purpose of the new rule serves as a
threshold test which determines how the remainder of the analysis should
proceed. If the new rule's purpose is to ensure a fair trial, then it must at
least be applied retroactively to all cases not final on the date of the new
rule's adoption. Retroactive application in other cases is determined by
consideration of the next two Judd factors. However, if the rule's purpose
is other that ensuring a fair trial, the purpose factor favors neither
retroactivity nor prospectivity. The court must then consider the remaining
two Judd factors to decide the retroactivity issue.
4. Whither Griffith? At the time of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Griffith, the Alaska Supreme Court still employed the Linkletter
test (as announced in Judd and refined by later decisions) for retroactive
application of new criminal rules. In Griffith, however, the Supreme Court
discarded the Linkletter test in favor of the full retroactive application of
new rules in all cases on direct review.217 The Griffith Court eliminated
any consideration of purpose, reliance, or administration of justice.
Nonetheless, in the period since the Griffith decision, the Alaska Supreme
Court has clung to the Linkletter-based Judd test in two decisions: Briggs
v. State Department of Public Safety' 8 and State v. Wickham? 9
In Briggs, decided about one month after Griffith, the court addressed
the retroactivity of its decision in Champion v. State Department of Public
Safety.220 Champion had extended the due process holding in
Municipality of Anchorage v. SerranoM' to drivers license revocation
proceedings.m In Briggs, Chief Justice Rabinowitz, again writing for the
court, referenced his prior opinion in Farleigh regarding the importance of
the purpose inquiry to the determination of the retroactivity issue.2 3
Although the language of Farleigh indicated that the purpose factor would
be dispositive, Chief Justice Rabinowitz also discussed the remaining Judd
216. Farleigh, 728 P.2d at 640-41 n.4.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
218. 732 P.2d 1078 (Alaska 1987).
219. 796 P.2d 1354 (Alaska 1990).
220. 721 P.2d 131 (Alaska 1986).
221. 649 P.2d 256 (Alaska CL App. 1982); see supra text accompanying notes 212-213.
222. Champion, 721 P.2d at 132-33.
223. Briggs, 732 P.2d at 1081 n.4.
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factors and concluded that neither factor weighed against retroactivity.2
He noted that, under Serrano, police already were required to preserve the
remnants of a breathalyzer test, regardless of its later possible use. Thus,
the court concluded that retroactive application of Champion was
appropriate.
The Briggs court next addressed the scope of this retroactive
application. Because Serrano clearly foreshadowed the holding in
Champion, the court held that Champion applied to all cases pending on
the date of the Serrano decision, or in which the breathalyzer test was
administered after the date of the Serrano decision.2
The court's decision in Briggs is based on the conclusion that
Champion did not announce a new rule, but was instead merely the
application of Serrano to a new context, drivers license revocation
proceedings." As discussed in Metcalfe v. StateW and State v. Glass
("Glass II' 2 9 the application of pre-existing rules is not subject to the
retroactivity analysis. If the court was in fact guided by this conclusion,
it is unclear why Chief Justice Rabinowitz chose to analyze the issue under
the Judd test.
The Briggs court made no mention of Griffith in its analysis. This
omission may be explained by the close proximity in time of Briggs and
Griffith. Such an omission three years later, in Wickham, however, is more
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1083.
228. 593 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1979).
229. 596 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1979); see supra text accompanying notes 201-206. The
Alaska Supreme Court addressed the issue of when aruleis "new for retroactivity purposes
in Metcatfe and Glass I. Metcalfe applied the United States Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). Chadwick invalidated a warrantless police
search of an individual's footlocker which had been lawfully seized and which the police
had probable cause to believe contained contraband. Id. at 5, 15-16. Chadwick was a
straightforward application of existing Supreme Court precedent to a new set of facts, and
thus, did not announce a "new" legal rule. See id. at 9-11.
Glass ) presented a different type of case. In Glass 1I, the Alaska Supreme Court
addressed the retroactive application of its own decision in State v. Glass ("Glass n"), 583
P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978). Glass I involved a legal issue of first impression in Alaska:
whether warrantless electronic monitoring of a defendant's conversation violated the
defendant's rights under the Alaska Constitution. Unlike the Chadwick decision, Glass I
was not controlled by prior case law. Thus, the Glass I court could not merely apply an
existing legal rule. It had to formulate its own rules and principles to guide its decision.
In doing so, the court considered and announced a new principle of law governing electronic
monitoring of defendants. In analyzing the retroactivity of Glass I, the Glass H court
announced the general rule that when "a decision simply applies an established rule of law,
even in a new factual situation, the question of retroactivity does not arise. The question
of retroactivity arises only when a court announces a new rule of law." Glass 11, 596 P.2d
at 9-11. The Glass H court held that Glass I announced a "new rule of law" and therefore
applied the Judd test to determine the retroactivity issue. Id. at 12-13.
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difficult to explain. Throughout the early application of the Judd test, the
Alaska Supreme Court generously referenced the United States Supreme
Court precedent as guidance and persuasive authority. As Alaska's
retroactivity jurisprudence developed, however, the court narrowed its
focus to Judd, Rutherford, and their progeny for precedent As the court
became more insular on this issue, perhaps it felt less tied to the Supreme
Court's retroactivity doctrine.
The Alaska Supreme Court's decision in State v. Wickhanr presents
an illustration of how the court has avoided tackling the merits of Griffith.
In Wickham, he court adopted the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Luce v. United States, ' which held that a defendant must testify at
trial to complain of improper impeachment by a prior conviction' The
court made no mention of Griffith and its implications for the Judd line of
cases. Instead, the court applied the three Judd factors and held that its
adoption of Luce applied only prospectively 33  While it might be
reasonable to stand by the line of established Alaska precedent in the area
of retroactivity, it still seems proper to consider the merits of the Griffith
approach before retaining a separate state approach to retroactivity analysis,
especially in light of the court's original reliance on the now-abandoned
Linkletter approach. To date, the Alaska Supreme Court has not done so.
C. Civil Retroactivity: All's Quiet on the Alaskan Front
Retroactivity in civil matters has not been nearly as tumultuous in
Alaska law. From the first cases in 1974 until the present, the Alaska
Supreme Court has largely applied the Supreme Court's Chevron test.'
This section references many of these cases, but more closely searches for
why the Alaska Supreme Court adopted and maintained the Chevron test.
In Schreiner v. Fruit,35 the court quoted the Chevron test and rested
its retroactivity holding on an application of that test.-6 This cursory
treatment of retroactivity continued in State v. McCrackenp and Kaatz
v. State 8 In McCracken, the court decided the retroactivity issues by
merely citing Chevron, without discussing or expressly adopting that
230. 796 P.2d 1354 (Alaska 1990).
231. 469 U.S. 38 (1984).
232. Id. at 43.
233. Wickharn, 796 P.2d at 43.
234. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
235. 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974).
236. Id. at 466-67.
237. 520 P.2d 787 (Alaska 1975).
238. 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975).
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decision. The Kaatz decision adopted a pure comparative negligence
scheme which the court gave retroactive application in certain cases, but
without reference to any factors, tests, considerations, or authority
governing its analysis or decision. 4
In Warwick v. State ex rel. Chance, ' the court again failed to
squarely address the question of the appropriate civil retroactivity test.
Faced with the retroactive application of collective bargaining provisions
in the public sector, the court quoted and applied the Chevron test, but
added a curious caveat, stating that "[w]hile we do not consider [the
Chevron test] to be binding on the court in all cases, the criteria can be
considered here.'" The court ultimately concluded that the rule should
be applied retroactively.4 3 Warwick was typical of the Alaska civil
retroactivity cases running through 1979 that applied Chevron without
discussing in depth the proper civil retroactivity testY'4 However, in
Plumley v. Hale,' the court did announce a guiding principle for civil
retroactivity. The court held that "[aibsent special circumstances, a new
decision of this court will be given effect in the case immediately before
the court, and will be binding in all subsequent cases in which the point in
question is properly raised .... .'"
Finally, in Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Byayuko 7 the
court settled on a civil retroactivity test and discussed its application.
Byayuk addressed the retroactivity of the court's decision in Commercial
Fisheries Entry Commission v. Templeton,2 8 which addressed the
Limited Entry ActU9 and the assessment of classification points in the
fishing permit application process. ° The court adopted a four-part test,
identical to the Chevron test, in analyzing the retroactivity of the civil
Templeton precedent:
239. McCracken, 520 P.2d at 789-90 n.6.
240. See Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1049-50.
241. 548 P.2d 384 (Alaska 1976).
242. Id. at 394.
243. Id. at 396.
244. See, e.g., H.A.M.5. Co. v. Elec. Contractors of Alaska, Inc., 566 P.2d 1012 (Alaska
1977); Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1976).
245. 594 P.2d 497 (Alaska 1979).
246. Plumley, 594 P.2d at 502-05 (finding that court's interpretation of "final passage"
within recorded vote requirement provision of Alaska Constitution deserved prospective
application but, in fairness to present litigants, applying rule to instant case).
247. 684 P.2d 114 (Alaska 1984).
248. 598 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1979).
249. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.010-.990 (1987).
250. Templeton, 598 P.2d at 79-80.
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1) whether the holding either overrules prior law or decides an issue of
first impression whose resolution was not foreshadowed;r l]
2) whether the purpose and intended effect of the new rule of law is best
accomplished by a retroactive or prospective application;
3) the extent of reasonable reliance upon the old rule of law; and
4) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of
the new rule of law?5
The Byayuk court held that the first part of the newly adopted civil
retroactivity analysis - the question whether a new legal rule is involved -
- acts as a threshold test.23  As discussed in the criminal context,24
retroactivity is not an issue if the court merely applies an existing rule of
law. The Byayuk court found that it faced a new legal rule and then
addressed the substance of its newly adopted test 55
The court first considered the "purpose and intended effect" of the new
rule,- labelling the purpose factor as "the single most important
criterion" in the civil retroactivity test. Indeed, where the new rule's
purpose strongly favors retroactivity, the second factor of government
reliance "is of minimal importance. '' 8 The court found that the purpose
of the Templeton rule was to avoid "unjust discrimination" in the allocation
of fishing licenses2 s The Byayuk court found that it could serve the
purpose of Templeton - avoiding unjust discrimination - only by
retroactively applying the presumably "jusf' allocation rule of Templeton.
The Byayuk court explained that analysis of the remaining retroactivity
factors, reasonable reliance and administration of justice, serves two
distinct functions: (1) they weigh with the "purpose" factor to determine
retroactive or prospective application; and (2) they determine the extent of
either retroactive or prospective application. ° This reiterates the broad
discretion announced in Lauderdale for the Alaska Supreme Court to craft
retroactivity rules on a case-by-case basis' Byayuk suggests that the
court may do the same thing in the civil context, considering reliance and
251. This prong of the test merely states the fact, stated throughout this article, and
specfically discussed supra at note 229 and accompanying text, that retroactivity deals only
with the application of "new" legal rules.
252. Byayuk, 684 P.2d at 117.
253. Id.
254. See supra note 229.
255. Byayuk, 684 P.2d at 118.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 119.
259. Id. at 118.
260. Id. at 119.
261. See supra text accompanying note 189.
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administration of justice in determining the extent of retroactive or
prospective application.
In the face of the clear purpose against unjust discrimination, the
Byayuk court accorded less weight to the importance of the reliance and
administration of justice factors. In doing so, the court weighed the
hardship to both the government and the affected private citizens. The
court found that the government's reliance and interest in mere
administrative convenience through avoiding re-evaluation of claims could
not outweigh the litigants' interests in having their claims properly and
justly evaluated.3~ Thus, the court concluded that it should give
Templeton retroactive application.Y4
The Byayuk court next considered the appropriate extent of retroactive
application for Templeton, i.e., from what point in time should Templeton
be retroactively applied. The court defined the "extent of retroactivity" as
a question of fairness to which the discussion of "general retroactivity is
wholly applicable. ' 5  In assessing the fairness issue, the court
considered the equity principles discussed above. The court noted that
non-retroactivity would discriminate arbitrarily based on"the fortuitous fact
that [some] cases were processed more promptly" than others.? Based
largely upon this fairness rationale, the court applied Templeton fully
retroactively; in other words, Templeton applied even to cases already
final. The fairness analysis made the "extent" inquiry malleable, able
to fit the court's conception of equity, justice and fairness.
The court has applied the Byayuk civil retroactivity doctrine on several
occasions.' The court has not recognized the retroactivity revolution
taking place in the Supreme Court.2 In looking to Linkletter and
Chevron, the Alaska Supreme Court relied on the persuasive authority of
the Supreme Court's holdings. Thus, the question arises: Should the
Alaska Supreme Court follow the lead of its federal sibling? The next
section examines this issue.
262. Byayuk, 684 P.2d at 119-20.
263. Id. at 120.
264. Id. at 121.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., Metcalf v. Felec Servs., 784 P.2d 1386 (Alaska 1990); Morrison v.
Afognak Logging, Inc., 768 P.2d 1139 (Alaska 1989); Truesdell v. Halliburton Co., 754
P.2d 236 (Alaska 1988); Suh v. Pingo Corp., 736 P.2d 342 (Alaska 1987); Alaskan Village,
Inc. v. Smalley, 720 P.2d 945 (Alaska 1986); Cashen v. Commercial Fisheries Entry
Comm'n, 686 P.2d 1219 (Alaska 1984); Ship Creek Hydraulic Syndicate v. Department of
Transp. and Pub. Facilities, 685 P.2d 715 (Alaska 1984).
269. But see Sub, 736 P.2d at 347-49 (Matthews, L, dissenting).
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D. Reliance, Equity, or the Constitution?
There are three main bases for deciding retroactivity questions:
reliance, equity, and constitutional considerations. Originally, in Linkletter
and Chevron, the Supreme Court recognized reliance to be the crucial
consideration.270 Griffith and Justice Souter's Beam opinion signalled a
shift to emphasizing equity.27' Complicating this mix are fleeting
references in Griffith and Justice Scalia's strong language in Beam
endorsing a constitutional view.2  Through all of this, the Alaska
Supreme Court has held fast to the Linkletter and Chevron analyses.
Justice Matthews' dissent in Suh v. Pingo Corp.,' is the court's only
reference to the recent federal retroactivity revolution. 4 Yet even this
reference did not confront the central challenges of Griffith and Beam.
Justice Matthews quoted Griffith as the court's "normal rule of
retroactivity,"' 275 but did not mention the sharp break with Linkletter that
was marked by Griffith. Griffith called into question the entire reliance-
equity balance struck in Linkletter and Chevron and adopted by Alaska.
With Grifflth and Beam largely unexamined by the Alaska Supreme
Court, Alaska retroactivity would seem open to re-assessment. The
remainder of this section discusses issues and possible resolutions that may
result from such a reconsideration. Although framed in terms of the
Alaska Supreme Court's resolution of these issues, this section also
provides a blueprint for litigants arguing retroactivity questions.
Do Griffith and Beam really present problems for Alaska retroactivity?
On one level the answer is clearly "no." The Supreme Court's decisions
on retroactivity, whether based on prudential or constitutional
considerations, are not binding on the Alaska Supreme Court. 6
However, to the extent that the court relied on the persuasive authority of
Linkletter and Chevron in formulating the Judd and Byayuk standards,
Grffith and Beam at least question the foundations of Alaska retroactivity
law. In its analysis of Alaska criminal retroactivity, the Alaska Supreme
Court cited extensively to federal precedent and ultimately adopted the
federal Linkletter standard. In doing so, the court largely mimicked the
Supreme Court's balancing of the reliance-equity principles. Similarly, on
270. See supra notes 18-31, 54-63 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 38, 83.
272. See supra notes 40-42, 74-78.
273. 736 P.2d 342 (Alaska 1987).
274. Suk, 736 P.2d at 347-49 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 348 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
276. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167. 175-76 (1990) ("When
questions of state law are at issue, state courts generally have the authority to determine the
retroactivity of their own decisions.").
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questions of civil retroactivity, the court's early decisions cited to Chevron
without independent discussion or analysis. Again, the court ultimately
adopted federal precedent in Byayuk, expressly applying a Chevron clone
test to subsequent cases. When the Supreme Court reconsidered Linkletter
and Chevron, the indisputable bases for Alaska retroactivity, it became
time, at the very least, for the court to reconsider the state's position on
this important issue.
If the Alaska Supreme Court reconsiders its retroactivity doctrines, this
reconsideration could occur on two fronts: (1) a re-balancing of equity and
reliance; or (2) an analysis grounded in constitutional separation of powers.
First, the court could follow Griffith (and Justice Souter's approach in
Beam), and re-balance the reliance-equity principles. Both the Griffith
court and Justice Souter's Beam opinion shifted the balance away from
reliance toward equity. Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court has suggested
a de-emphasis of the reliance factor in cases such as Farleigh and Byayuk,
where the court has stressed the purpose consideration.
In re-balancing the reliance-equity principles, the court would have two
options for change. First, the court could follow Griffith in holding that
equity requires a rule of full retroactivity for all cases not final on the date
of the new rule. Alternatively, the court could strengthen its presumption
in favor of retroactivity, overcoming that presumption only when
retroactivity would work extreme hardship or unfairness. The first option
would be a bright-line rule with the advantage of establishing certainty in
the law of retroactivity. Conversely, the second option reserves a
substantial amount of discretion for the court to tailor its decision to the
equities of a particular case. The court's consistent emphasis on, and
utilization of, a flexible, malleable retroactivity approach suggests that the
court might prefer the latter option? 7
The second front for re-analyzing Judd and Byayuk would consider
Justice Scalia's proposal of a constitutionally based retroactivity doctrine.
Justice Scalia's proposal, being based in the nature of the Article I
"judicial Power,"2 78 would not bind Alaska courts. The Alaska
Constitution, however, similarly grants the "judicial power" to the judges
of the state 79 Thus, Justice Scalia's argument regarding the proper
understanding of the role of the judiciary applies with equal strength within
Alaska's tripartite system of separated powers. To the extent that Justice
Scalia's view gains support on the Supreme Court, its persuasive authority
for Alaska courts should increase.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 189, 265-267.
278. U.S. CONSr. art III, § 1.
279. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 1 ('The judicial power of the state is vested in a
supreme court, a superior court, and the courts established by the legislature.").
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A deeper look at Justice Scalia's position, however, calls into question
its validity for Alaska law. Justice Scalia appealed to the common law
understanding of the "judicial Power" at the time of the Constitution's
framing. As Justice Scalia noted, many of the framers adhered to the
traditional "find-make" distinction in defining the proper role of the
judiciary." If Justice Scalia's historical approach is utilized, we would
appeal to the meaning of the phrase "judicial power" at the time of the
framing and ratification of the Alaska Constitution. In the time since the
framing of the federal Constitution, the "find-make" distinction has been
discredited. Indeed, the Linkletter Court thoroughly rejected this view
when constructing the first modem retroactivity doctrine. Amidst these
events, the Alaska Constitution was framed and ratified. In other words,
the nature of the judicial role had changed at the time of the framing and
ratification of the Alaska Constitution. Thus, a Justice Scalia-like historical
argument might actually provide a constitutional basis in support of the
decisions in Judd and Byayuk; at the very least, it might suggest that the
Alaska "judicial power" is not bound up in the outmoded "find-make"
conception of the judicial role.
IV. CONCLUSION
Only one point comes out of this retroactivity discussion: at present,
Alaska and federal retroactivity law are not consistent with each other. The
republican spirit imbued in our federal system allows Alaska to part ways
with federal precedent on this issue. The United States Supreme Court's
doctrines announced in Gifflth and Beam may not be appropriate for
Alaska in light of the Alaska Supreme Court's subsequent decisions or the
Alaska Constitution. Indeed, the Alaska Supreme Court has shown a
strong preference for flexibility and ad hoc balancing on the question of
retroactivity. If the court chooses to retain this doctrine of flexibility,
however, it has a responsibility to address the non-federal bases of this
choice, independently justifying this choice to those the decision will most
deeply affect: the people of the State of Alaska.
280. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439,2451 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment).
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